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Consciousness and Coincidence:  





Abstract: In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers briefly raises a problem about how 
the connection between consciousness and our verbal and other behavior appears “lucky”. I raise some 
questions about Chalmers’s formulation of the problem. Then I develop an alternative formulation. 
Finally, I consider some responses, including illusionism about consciousness.  
 
Chalmers’ meta-problem about consciousness concerns the explanation of our 
problem responses to consciousness, where those responses are characterized in 
physical-functional terms. For instance, why are we disposed to utter sentences like 
“consciousness is irreducible” and “the quality red is distinct from any physical 
property”?  
Given the causal closure of the physical realm, there are bound to be 
computational processes in the brain that explain such verbal reports, as Chalmers 
notes (p.8). What, then, is the problem? Chalmers suggests that one problem is that it 
is lucky that these processes are accompanied by consciousness.  
I will first raise some questions about Chalmers’s luck problem. Then I will 
develop a problem in the vicinity, the normative harmony problem. Finally, I will 
consider some responses, including illusionism about consciousness.  
 
1. What is Chalmers’s Luck Problem? 
 
Here is Chalmers’s most general characterization of his luck problem:  
 
As long as we have modal independence, so that the meta-problem 
processes [the computational processes that explain our reports - AP] 
could have come apart from consciousness, it can seem lucky that they 
have not . . .Where realization is concerned, it seems lucky that the 
                                                        
* Thanks to David Chalmers, François Kammerer, Brad Saad and an anonymous 
referee for very helpful discussion or comments.  
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meta-problem processes are in fact realized by consciousness rather 
than by something else. In the case of consciousness, one has a very 
strong sort of modal independence, in that there seems to be a near-
complete structural explanation of the intuitions that could obtain 
without consciousness. It is easy to get the sense that what really 
explains the intuitions is the structure of cognitive processes, and the 
fact that consciousness is connected to that structure is something of a 
fortunate and optional extra. (p.48) 
 
Once we can explain our conviction that consciousness exists without 
assuming that consciousness exists, the fact that the conviction is true 
seems somewhat miraculous. (p.56) 
 
So, Chalmers says that, given modal independence, the following is “lucky”, even 
“miraculous”:   
 
[A] The computational processes that explain our verbal reports 
(“consciousness is irreducible”, “consciousness exists”, “I am conscious 
of red”) are accompanied by consciousness.  
 
He regards this as a significant problem, which may require a radical solution.1   
I have two questions. First, what does Chalmers mean by saying that [A] is lucky, 
and why would this be a problem? Does he mean that it “cries out” for explanation? 
Would he agree with White (2005, p.3) that something is “lucky” in this sense if it 
lowers the probability of one’s previously favored explanation and raises the 
probability of some alternative hypothesis?  
                                                        
1 For instance, Chalmers (p.48) considers the radical solution that “only consciousness could realize the 
relevant processes, subject to certain constraints”. This solution apparently rejects modal independence. 
But I don’t see how it could be right – especially if, like Chalmers, we think conceivability supports 
possibility. For instance, given Russellian Monism (a view Chalmers has sympathy with), the 
computational processes that explain our verbal reports are in fact realized by special proto-phenomenal 
properties that (in the right combination) constitute conscious experiences. But it’s conceivable (cannot be 
conclusively ruled out a priori) that they should have been realized by non-proto-phenomenal properties 
that are insufficient for conscious experience, in which case all of us would have been zombies. So isn’t it 
“lucky” that they are realized by the special proto-phenomenal properties (Pautz 2015, section 4)? 
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Second, is Chalmers right in suggesting that, “as long as we have modal 
independence”, [A] is lucky?  
Here is an apparent counterexample. Consider a form of identity theory on which 
conscious experiences are necessarily identical with carbon-based biological states 
P1, P2 , . . . which in fact realize the meta-problem computational processes causing 
our reports (Chalmers, p.37). This view uphold modal independence as Chalmers 
defines it: the computational processes that explain our verbal reports might have 
“obtained without consciousness”. For, in an alternative history of the universe, 
creatures very much like ourselves might have evolved in whom these computational 
processes are instead realized by silicon-based based states P1*,  P2 *, . . . Now these 
states are only trivially physically different from our own. Still, on the identity theory, 
our hypothetical functional-isomorphs would consequently not be conscious, even 
though, at a certain level of abstraction, their computational processes would be the 
same as ours and generate the same verbal responses. They merely have “ersatz-
experiences”, while we have experiences. (Compare: twater made from XYZ on Twin 
Earth is not water.) 
While the identity theory upholds modal independence, I don’t think it must face a 
deep luck problem. Identity theorists probably should accept “deflationary pluralism” 
(Lee 2019). Our carbon-based states P1, P2 , . . . (genuine experiences) are no better 
(in value, epistemic significance, naturalness) than our hypothetical isomorphs’ 
silicon-based states P1*,  P2 *, . . .  (“ersatz-experiences”), because the difference is 
trivial. For instance, we have reliably true and justified ordinary introspective beliefs 
about our experiences (“I’m having an orange after-image”, etc.); our twins have 
reliably true and justified ordinary introspective beliefs about their t-experiences. 
(Compare: we have reliably true beliefs about water; our twins on Twin Earth have 
reliably true beliefs about twater.) Given deflationary pluralism, the fact that the 
computational processes are accompanied by conscious experiences is not in any 
sense “miraculous” or “lucky”. For, on the present deflationary view, it just amounts 
to the fact that they are realized by the right kind of carbon-based states – rather than, 
say, silicon-based states. And this doesn’t seem “miraculous” or “lucky” in any 
puzzling sense. In fact, it seems unremarkable. It is unlike a monkey typing “All the 
world’s a stage”. 
So I doubt Chalmers’s suggestion that “as long as we have modal independence” 
there is a significant problem about miraculous luck or coincidence. This raises a 
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question: If modal independence isn’t enough, what assumptions are required to 
generate such a problem?  
 
2. An Alternative Formulation: The Normative Harmony Problem 
 
I suggest that three assumptions are needed to generate a significant problem about 
“luck” or “coincidence”:  
 
Distinctness: Conscious states are distinct from all physical-functional states of 
persons. On the version I will focus on, they consist in standing in an irreducible 
relation of conscious representation to edenic qualities (p.25, 34).  
 
Essential normative significance: Conscious states have built-in normative 
features. For instance, maybe it is in the essence of state of being ostensibly 
conscious of a reddish and round thing that it gives you reason to believe (i) that 
a reddish and round item is present (“dogmatism”), (ii) that you are conscious, 
(iii) that the quality red is simple, etc. Other conscious states have intrinsic value 
or disvalue; it’s in their essences to provide a reason to desire that they continue 
or stop. Maybe only experiences could be the source of such reasons.  
 
Causal closure: The physical realm is causally closed. There is no top-down 
causation.  
 
To illustrate how these assumptions can generate a “coincidence” problem, let us 





Figure 1: epiphenomenalist dualism 
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Here, internal physical neuro-computational state P causes certain responses, like 
“I’m conscious of red”. The upward arrow indicates distinctness, with physical states 
and conscious experiences being connected by psychophysical laws. These laws might 
have the form:  
 
[#] For any x, if x is in physical-functional state P, then x is in the (distinct) state 
of standing in an irreducible relation of conscious representation to edenic 
quality f(P), 
 
where f is a systematic function from physical states (e. g. states in a neural similarity-
space) onto edenic qualities. The arrow going from conscious experiences to reasons 
indicates essential normative significance. The absence of any downward arrow from 
our conscious experiences to our responses goes with causal closure. For instance, on 
this view, the non-physical event of feeling of pain in your hand provides you with a 
reason to withdraw it from the fire, but it is not the cause of your withdrawing. 
As Chalmers notes, dualism faces a “coincidence” problem: 
 
Where psychophysical laws are concerned [e. g. laws of form [#] above - AP], it 
seems lucky that the laws are as they are. Only this luck ensures that we are not 
in a zombie world with physical processes and phenomenal intuitions but no 
consciousness, or in an inverted world where these processes yield pleasure 
when we feel pain. (p.48) 
 
But what exactly is the problem here? My formulation of the problem differs from 
Chalmers’s (§1). The problem for epiphenomenalist dualists is not about the 
“luckiness” of [A]. Rather, it concerns how to explain the following striking 
regularity, a regularity whose formulation presupposes distinctness and essential 
normative significance: 
 
Normative harmony: In every case, the psychophysical laws correlate a physical-
functional state P with a distinct conscious experience C whose essential normative role 
in providing reasons is harmonious with the causal role of P in generating verbal and 
other responses.  
 
Call this the normative harmony problem (Pautz 2010, p. 359, 365).  
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Here is an illustration. You undergo physical-functional state P that causes you to 
say “I’m conscious of the quality red”. In agreement with normative harmony, a 
psychophysical law maps this physical-functional state onto the distinct state of 
standing in an irreducible relation of conscious representation to edenic red, which is 
precisely what is needed for you to have a basic reason to believe I’m conscious of the 
quality red. Likewise, the physical-functional states of your color system cause you to 
make certain similarity-reports and engage in certain ordering behavior. The 
psychological laws map them onto distinct color experiences whose reason-grounding 
roles are harmonious with these responses.   
On epiphenomenalist dualism, normative harmony might have failed. For 
instance, different laws might instead have mapped all our physical-functional states 
P1, P2, . . . onto the same bodily sensation: a full-body lukewarm sensation (as when 
you are in lukewarm pool). In this scenario, we’re blind as bats and always have the 
same simple sensation – we’re nearly zombies. Yet, given causal closure, all of our 
complex behaviors and responses would be the same, and therefore totally out of 
whack what we have reason to believe and desire given our simple experience. What – 
short of an intelligent designer – might explain why the psychological laws are 
actually “fine-tuned” to result in normative harmony? 
Here is another illustration. Suppose that neural pattern Z is caused by eating 
rotten flesh and causes withdrawal. Neural pattern X is caused by eating oranges and 
causes eating more. These are affective responses. Now, it is in the essence of the 
experience of edenic rottenness to provide a reason to desire that the experience stop, 
and it is in the essence of the experience of edenic sweetness to provide a reason to 
desire that the experience continue. That is, the first experience is essentially bad 
(disvalue) while the second is essentially good (value). In accordance with normative 
harmony, the psychophysical laws map pattern Z and pattern X onto these 
experiences, resulting in a harmony between reasons and behavior. But, in a 
physically identical world, the psychological laws could have mapped Z and X onto 
valence-inverted experiences – the kind of possibility Chalmers alludes to in the 
passage quoted above. In this horrific yuck-yum inversion scenario, oranges taste like 
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rotten flesh but (given causal closure) we gobble them up and say “they taste great” 
just as in the actual world.2 Why does normative harmony actually obtain? 
Notice that causal closure is a crucial element of normative harmony problem. 
Interactionist dualists who reject causal closure might explain normative harmony by 
saying that our behavioral responses are sensitive, in a top-down way, to the built-in 
normative features of our experiences (see Saad 2019).  
Now that we understand the normative harmony problem, we can see that it arises 
equally for an “emergentist” form of physicalism that endorse distinctness, normative 
significance, and causal closure: 
 
 
Figure 2: emergent physicalism  
 
Emergent physicalism is just like epiphenomenalist dualism. In fact, it might 
accept the very same psychophysical laws of form [#]. The only difference: it 
maintains that those same laws have a different modal status, in particular, they 
metaphysically necessary “grounding laws”, rather than contingent laws of nature 
(Schaffer MS).  
Emergent physicalism is stronger than “non-reductive physicalism”. Non-
reductive physicalists deny that experience properties are identical with “physical 
properties” but they often hold that they are identical with physically-realized 
“functional properties”. By contrast, emergent physicalism holds that experience 
properties are even distinct from “functional properties”. In fact, in one version, they 
are quite different from the underlying physical-functional properties in their structure 
and normative nature: they consist in standing in an irreducible relation of conscious 
representation to edenic qualities, and it is in their constitutive essence to provide 
reasons for certain beliefs and desires.  
                                                        
2 These subjects exhibit a kind of rational absurdity. But we should not confuse rational absurdity with 
metaphysical impossibility. The cases are certainly conceivable (i.e., cannot be conclusively ruled out a 
priori).  
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As I said, on emergent physicalism, conscious experiences of edenic qualities (C) 
are grounded by the computational physical states (P) that causally explain our 
consciousness-related responses, rather than being merely nomically determined by 
them as on epiphenomenalist dualism. Given a suitable counterfactual/proportionality 
theory of causation, this means that they count as “supervenient causes” of our 
responses. In Figure 2, this is indicated by the dotted arrow. 
Here is why emergent physicalism faces the normative harmony problem no less 
than epiphenomenalist dualism. True, it is unlike epiphenomenalist dualism in holding 
that laws of form [#] are metaphysically necessary grounding laws. But it still implies 
normative harmony. That is, it still implies a striking pattern in the “psychophysical 
laws”: they always correlate a physical state P with a distinct conscious experience C 
whose essential normative role in providing reasons is harmonious with the causal 
role of P in generating responses, the ways I indicated above. Further, since the basic 
psychophysical grounding laws have no explanation and are independent of the 
normative laws, the agreement here would seem inexplicable. It must be accepted 
with “natural piety”. This should lower our credence in the view. 
There were already familiar problems with emergent physicalism. Proponents of 
this view accept laws of form [#] – the very same laws accepted by dualists. True, 
they hold that these laws are metaphysically necessary grounding laws, rather than 
contingent laws as dualists maintain. But this does not change the fact that they add to 
the complexity of our theory of the world (unlike psychophysical identities). And they 
are anomalous in that they are quite different from all other general fundamental-to-
nonfundamental grounding principles (e. g. mereological principles, principles of 
complex-property-formation). The normative harmony problem adds to these familiar 
problems. It shows that the grounding laws have a further implausible feature: in each 
and every case they inexplicably always satisfy normative harmony.3 
                                                        
3 To see clearly that the normative problem goes beyond the familiar problems, consider Campbell’s (1993) 
“emergent physicalism” about colors. It faces the familiar problems – it requires anomalous, complex 
grounding laws between reflectances and edenic colors – but it doesn’t face the normative harmony 
problem. It is not the case that, of all the epistemically possible chromatic-physical associations (“chromatic 
grounding laws”), the one that in fact obtains stands out as achieving “normative harmony”. For, unlike 
experiences, edenic colors are normatively inert.  
 
Forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies 
 9 
In §1, I rejected Chalmers’s suggestion that modal independence alone is 
sufficient for a problem about luck or coincidence. Now we see that modal 
independence is not necessary. For emergent physicalists can reject modal 
independence. But they still face a coincidence problem because they still accept 
normative harmony, as I have explained.  
 
3. Response: Identity Theory? 
 
What is the solution to the normative harmony problem?  
Notice that the very formulation of normative harmony builds in a commitment to 
both distinctness and essential normative significance. It requires the kind of picture 
of conscious experience represented in Figures 1 and 2. There are two things: the 
causal roles of our physical states (the bottom level), and the essential normative roles 
of our experiences (the top level). The problem concerns the coincidence between the 
two.  
Therefore, one way to avoid the problem would be to adopt a different picture of 
consciousness that rejects these commitments. For example, let us again look at the 
identity theory discussed in §1. Identity theorists reject distinctness. It is not the case 
that your conscious experience is a relation to edenic qualities that is distinct from, but 
dependent on, your neural state P, which cases your responses. Rather, it is nothing 




Figure 3: identity theory 
 
Identity theorists also reject essential normative significance. On their view, color 
experiences, taste experiences, experiences of pain and pleasure are nothing but neural 
patterns. And it is very hard to see how it might be in the essences of particular neural 
patterns that they provide reasons for certain beliefs or desires. Instead, identity 
theorists are likely to accept a reliabilist reduction of the justificatory-role of 
experiences (neural states) and a response-dependent, desire-based reduction of their 
goodness and badness. It’s not in the essences of any neural patterns to reliably cause 
certain beliefs or to be desired by normal subjects. So, on these views, it’s not in their 
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essences to justify certain beliefs, or to be good or bad. True, pretheoretically, it is 
very natural to think that some experiences essentially provide reasons for certain 
beliefs and some experiences are essentially good or bad. But the present view denies 
this. The normative features of experiences derive from their non-essential causal 
roles.4   
Since the formulation of normative harmony builds in a commitment to 
distinctness and essential normative significance, and since identity theorists reject 
these assumptions, they reject normative harmony as I have formulated it. And since 
they reject it, they face no problem about its explanation. In other words, the 
normative harmony problem is about the coincidence between “two things” – the 
causal roles of our physical states and the essential normative roles of our distinct 
experiences. Identity theorists deny that there are such “two things” here, thereby 
dodging this particular problem.  
However, maybe identity theorists face a problem in the vicinity. For instance, 
they do accept the following regularities: (I) experiences tend to cause doxastic 
responses (introspective and perceptual) that are “fitting” or “justified” and (II) we 
tend to act as if we desire good sensations and act if we don’t desire bad sensations. 
What explains (I) and (II)? 
Identity theorists might respond that (I) holds because experiences (neural states) 
are likely to be connected to reliable (introspective and perceptual) belief-forming 
mechanisms and the outputs of those are ipso facto justified. And they might say that 
(II) holds because of the response-dependent nature of the goodness and badness of 
sensations. Crudely, a good sensation (that is, on the identity theory, a “good” neural 
state) is just one we desire to have, and in turn desiring to have is (roughly) acting as 
if one desires to have; whereas a bad sensation (that is, a “bad” neural state) is just 
one we desire not to have and desiring not to have is acting as if one desires not to 
have (being disposed to withdraw, etc.). Putting these together, identity theorists can 
explain (II): why we tend to act as if we desire good sensations and act if we don’t 
desire bad sensations.  
                                                        
4 Identity theorists who take a response-dependent view of valence might appeal to “rigidification” on our 
actual responses in order to provide true readings to statements like “Necessarily, pain (on this view, a 
neural pattern) is bad”. But they still cannot claim that it is flows from the essence of pain itself (on this 
view, a certain neural pattern) that it is bad. (Perhaps the essentialist claim could be accommodated by a 
functionalist identity theory of experiences that builds in our typical responses.)  
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Another attempt to saddle identity theorists with a troubling regularity looks for a 
pattern in the psychophysical identities. For example: [R] taste sensations (e. g. sweet-
citrus experience, rotten-flesh experience) with their essential reason-grounding roles 
always happen to be identical with physical states (X-pattern, Y-pattern) that cause 
responses matching those essential reason-grounding roles. Now, these identities are 
conceptually independent from the physical facts; it is conceptually possible that they 
should instead have been such as to falsify [R] - even inverted. Is regularity [R], and 
this sense of “could have been otherwise”, enough to generate a luck problem for 
identity theorists? Could a problem for them be that the pattern of identities is lucky?  
Identity theorists can reply that the alleged regularity [R] presupposes that 
experiences have essential reason-grounding roles. But, as we saw, they can reject 
this. In that case, [R] cannot be troubling because it is false.  
In short, the identity theory of conscious experiences, when supplemented with a 
reliability theory of their justifying role and response-dependent theory of their 
goodness and badness, might avoid any problem about “luck” or “coincidence”.  
Still, I cannot accept such an identity theory - and I don’t think Chalmers can 
either. Experiences are relations to edenic colors and shapes and so on. But this is not 
true of the underlying neural patterns, computational states, and so on: they can be 
characterized fully without mentioning edenic colors and shapes. In addition, it’s 
conceivable that a mereologically simple thing should have an experience; but such a 
thing couldn’t undergo a neural pattern. For these reasons, experiences must be 
distinct from underlying neuro-computational states, even they are dependent on 
them.5 In addition, I think it’s just obvious that some experiences essentially provide 
reasons to believe certain things (contrary to reliabilism), and that some experiences 
are essentially good or bad (contrary to response-dependent theories of valence).  
So, if we have conscious experiences at all, the right view will be either dualism 
(Figure 1) or emergent physicalism (Figure 2) – resulting in the normative harmony 
problem.  
4. Response: Strong Illusionism? 
 
                                                        
5 These arguments work equally against a “Russellian monist” form of the identity theory (see Pautz 2015, 
section 2).   
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This suggests a truly desperate solution: maybe we don’t have conscious experiences 
at all! For example, we are familiar with the idea that colors-as-we-see-them (edenic 
colors) are illusions. Why not go one step further and say that it’s also an illusion that 
we have experiences as of colors?   
My first reaction is the same as Chalmers’ (p.54). In some cases, it is certain that 
I have an experience.  
But I worry about this. For what could explain our having indefeasible 
justification for certain introspective beliefs (I’m having an experience), but defeasible 
justification for perceptual beliefs (there is a reddish item there)?  
One explanation - favored by Chalmers (p.25) – is that (i) here in the actual world 
we are automatically “acquainted” with our own states of consciousness but not the 
states of the mind-independent world and (ii) acquaintance suffices for indefeasible 
justification.  
But (ii) faces a simple objection. Presumably, in some other “possible world”, we 
might be acquainted with an external state, say the redness of a tomato; but here 
acquaintance would not yield indefeasible justification (if in this world you were 
presented with strong but misleading arguments for color illusionism you should 
decrease your credence in the claim that a red thing is there).  
Another explanation is that all and only phenomenal truths about yourself are 
automatically part of your evidence (the “phenomenal conception of evidence”), so 
that you trivially have maximal justification for believing all such truths (they have 
probability 1 given your evidence).  
But this explanation overshoots: it entails that you even have maximal 
justification for believing obscure structural truths about experiences (e.g. the ratio 
scale for loudness). This is contrary to my (tenuous) grasp of the term-of-art 
“propositional justification”.  
Maybe the lesson is that we can be certain that we are conscious but this is an 
inexplicable epistemic fact. But suppose instead that we must give up on certainty. We 
merely have defeasible reason to think we are conscious. Even then I think we should 
reject illusionism.  
The fact is, illusionism isn’t helpful. Arguably, no reductive theory of 
representation could explain how we have illusions in which we (falsely) represent 
ourselves as being conscious of edenic red, if nothing has ever been conscious of 
edenic red and these terms (“conscious of”, “edenic red”) are indefinable. If so, 
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illusionists require a problematic form of emergent physicalism (§2) on which the 
representation relation here is irreducible to any physical (e. g. causal-informational) 
relation.6 Additionally, if the illusion states essentially play certain normative roles (e. 
g. it’s in the nature of the illusion of pain that we have a reason to avoid it; see 
Kammerer forthcoming for discussion) and those normative roles are harmonious with 
our responses, it may face a reformulated version of the normative harmony problem, 





I don’t have a good response to the normative harmony problem (but see Pautz 2010, 
p.358 for a desperate attempt). I consider it to be a deeply troubling but largely 
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